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GLOSSARY 
CRA – Credit Risk Agency 
EU – European Union. 
JCR – Japan Credit Rating Agency 
R&I – Japan Rating & Investment Information 
S&P – Standard and Poor’ s 
  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We study the variables that most affect the sovereign ratings change in the EU for 
Credit Rating Agencies Fitch and S&P. Using a panel probit model we assess the impact 
of different economic and political variables on sovereign ratings general change, 
increase and decrease before and after the Great Recession. Most importantly, we also 
analyse the lead lag time for each rating agency in these two periods, covering specifically 
1997:12-2018:12. Our results show that economic and political variables are considered 
differently in both periods and that the lead lag for rating changes decreases after the 
crisis, especially when this change is a decrease in the rating. We then enrich the 
discussion by bringing some behavioural concepts into the reasoning of that change in 
the variables and lead lag behaviour.  
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EU SOVEREIGN RATINGS LAGS PRIOR AND AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION 
By Grazielli Angelucci Paineli 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The conflict of interests faced by Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) was brought to 
higher evidence after the Great Recession in 2008. In this context, Bolton et al. (2007) 
described the three sources of conflicts: (i) CRAs conflict of understating risk to attract 
business, (ii) issuer´s ability to purchase only the most favourable ratings, and (3) the 
trusting nature of some investor clienteles.  
Specifically for the sovereign credit ratings, the above can also apply. Reason being 
for instance, for the EU, as reported by Afonso et al. (2012), there were significant 
responses of government bond yield spreads to changes in rating notations and outlook, 
particularly in the case of negative announcements. 
Also, on many other occasions, critiques arose on CRAs considerable time lag 
responding, i.e., ratings were not immediately downgraded once the problems in the sub-
prime market became clear, hence CRAs were slow in adjusting their ratings. For 
instance, the day before Lehman went bankrupt on September 2018, the major CRAs gave 
the bank still investment grade ratings (Haan and Amtenbrink, 2011) or until a few days 
before Enron's bankruptcy in November 2001, all three major agencies rated it in the 
investment category: Standard & Poor's and Fitch gave it a BBB rating and Moody's gave 
it a notch below Baa3 rating (Jeon and Lovo, 2013). 
Either aimed at private or sovereign institutions, CRAs usually provide an 
independent assessment on the ability of the issuer to meet their debt obligations and also 
an ongoing monitoring on the issuer rating in order to assess whether any relevant events 
have happened since the initial rating. Those services, despite of being used for important 
decision making for investors, regulators and institutions, are disclaimed always as the 
CRAs opinions.    
However, if ratings are nothing more than opinions, they are subjected to the 
psychology of decision-making. Thaler (2015) and Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) 
bring two very important findings from that theory that may fit into the Rating agencies 
decision making: (i) present bias: the events in the present (or recent past) matter most in 
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decision making compared to past events and (ii) individuals and organizations often rely 
on simple heuristics in an adaptive way: deviations from logical or statistical principles 
become routinely interpreted as judgmental biases and attributed to cognitive heuristics 
such as “representativeness”, in this particular case, professional experience and historical 
events can lead to cognitive heuristics.  
Therefore, this paper analyses the behaviour of the rating agencies S&P and Fitch 
prior and after the Great Recession, during the period 1997:12-2018:12 for 28 EU 
countries, asking whether they have taken longer to change sovereign credit ratings in the 
EU prior to the crisis compared to after the crisis. Our main results show that the lead lag 
for rating changes decreases after the crisis, especially when this change is a decrease in 
the rating.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the literature 
review; Section 3 provides the empirical analysis, which is composed by the sub-sections 
methodology, data, results; and Section 4 is the conclusion.  
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
There have been several studies regarding the transparency of the methodology used 
by CRAs (Hill, Brooks, and Faff, 2010; Bolton, Freixas, and Shapito, 2007; Jeon and 
Lovo, 2013; Vaaler, Mcnamara, and Mcnamara, 2004) and many other attempts to 
calibrate existing methods and also to create independent, simple data driven models that 
can provide a timely and consistent rating for counties (Polito and Wickens, 2015; Wei, 
2003; Van Gestel et al., 2006; Bennell et al., 2006; Fernández-Navarro et al., 2013; Duan 
and Laere, 2012). 
However, prior literature on lead-lags analysis of ratings is very limited. Güttler and 
Wahrenburg (2006) assess biases in corporate credit ratings and lead-lag relationships for 
near-to-default issuers with multiple ratings by Moody’s and S&P and found evidence 
that Moody’s seems to adjust its ratings to increasing default risk in a timelier manner 
than S&P and that given a downgrade (upgrade) by the first rating agency, subsequent 
downgrades (upgrades) by the second rating agency are of greater magnitude in the short 
term. Guettler (2010) also analysed the statement that rating downgrades are known to 
make subsequent downgrades more likely and showed that investors, banks, and 
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regulators face a substantial risk of ignorance if they neglect the effect of rating 
downgrade momentum. 
Nevertheless, the abovementioned literature is focused on corporate ratings and as 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010) stated, there are significant discrepancies between 
corporate and sovereign ratings performance. Rating agencies apply different approaches 
and consider different inputs to evaluate the credit- worthiness of corporate and sovereign 
issuers. They investigated the presence of lead–lag relationships among sovereign ratings 
assigned by five agencies, namely Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, Japan Credit Rating Agency 
(JCR) and Japan Rating & Investment Information (R&I) and showed that there exists 
interdependence in rating actions. Upgrade (downgrade) probabilities are much higher, 
and downgrade (upgrade) probabilities are much lower for a sovereign issuer with a recent 
upgrade (downgrade) by another agency. S&P tends to demonstrate the least dependence 
on other agencies, and Moody’s tends to be the first mover in upgrades. Rating actions 
by Japanese agencies tend to lag those of the larger agencies, although there is some 
evidence that they lead Moody’s downgrades. 
This difference in behaviour can be explained through the essence of the credit ratings 
decisions. Vaaler et al. (2004) analysed whether expert decision making is vulnerable to 
distortion. Their findings undermined objectivity as, in their words, “decision making by 
expert organizations is significantly and substantially distorted by industry turbulence and 
positioning”. Hence, while the main CRAs continue to attribute ratings based on their 
own models it is important to understand how their behaviour affects the ratings outcome. 
Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) describe two types of tasks that involve different 
behaviors. Tasks at the extreme judgmental end of the continuum are opinion questions 
such that no answer is more accurate than any other; intellective tasks are those that one 
could prove the accuracy of the correct response. As Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) 
also described 
“(Simon 1978) stressed in his Nobel Memorial Lecture, the classical model of rationality requires 
knowledge of all the relevant alternatives, their consequences and probabilities, and a predictable 
world without surprises. These conditions, however, are rarely met for the problems that 
individuals and organizations face. (L. J. Savage 2010), known as the founder of modern Bayesian 
decision theory, called such perfect knowledge small worlds, to be distinguished from large 
worlds. In large worlds, part of the relevant information is unknown or has to be estimated from 
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small samples, so that the conditions for rational decision theory are not met, making it an 
inappropriate norm for optimal reasoning.” 
Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) research also shows that confidence should better predict 
influence on intellective rather than judgmental tasks simply because both confidence and 
influence are more highly correlated to a third variable, accuracy, for the intellective task. 
As Cantor and Packer (1996) described, ratings can be largely explained by a small 
set of specific and measurable variables: per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, 
external debt, level of economic development and default history. Afonso, Gomes, and 
Rother (2011) also concluded that changes in GDP per capita, GDP growth, government 
debt, government balance have a short-run impact on a country’s credit rating, while 
government effectiveness, external debt, foreign reserves and default history are 
important long-run determinants. That being, CRAs decisions are more of an intellective 
than a judgmental one and; as a result, they are subjected to overconfidence in their 
decision-making (Zarnoth and Sniezek 1997). This overconfidence leads decision makers 
to have the tendency to focus on their own abilities and successes rather than on 
situational factors (Gärling et al. 2009). This tendency continues until a breakpoint event, 
an external or internal shock such as a crisis happens, leading to a change in behaviour. 
In the case of the CRAs, it leads to a mass change in sovereign ratings and, consequently, 
herd behaviour (Haan and Amtenbrink 2011; Eijffinger 2012; Zarnoth and Sniezek 1997; 
Güttler and Wahrenburg 2006). As Güttler and Wahrenburg (2006) described, given a 
downgrade (upgrade) by the first rating agency, subsequent downgrades (upgrades) by 
the second rating agency are of greater magnitude in the short term and, harsher rating 
changes by one agency are followed by harsher rating changes in the same direction by 
the second agency. Other authors have also shown the level of pro-cyclicality and the 
“cliff effect” brought by the CRAs worsening the crisis. As Jeon and Lovo (2013) stated: 
“For instance, during the Euro zone crisis, the agencies were initially slow to downgrade Greek 
debt, especially Moody's which waited until December 2009 before taking its first decision. This 
waiting period was followed by a period of severe downgrades: after leaving the Greek rating 
unchanged from 2003 to 2009, Moody's downgraded it by nine notches in the fifteen months that 
followed. In particular, a downgrade from an investment grade to a speculative grade can be self-
fulfilling. More precisely, given that regulations constrain many institutional investors to hold only 
bonds of investment grades, such downgrade can cause massive sales and make borrowing very 
difficult for the issuer. This is called the ‘cliff effect’.” 
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Reusens and Croux (2017) found empirical evidence that the credit rating agencies 
changed their sovereign credit rating assessment after the start of the European debt crisis. 
They state that financial balance, the economic development and the external debt became 
substantially more important after 2009, and the effect of Eurozone membership switched 
from positive to negative. In addition, GDP growth and government debt, as well as their 
interaction, gained much importance, such that the positive effect of GDP growth on the 
credit rating became considerable, especially for highly indebted sovereigns, and that the 
negative effect of government debt became large, especially for low growth countries. 
This behaviour is presented in our results: pre crisis, rating change decisions did not 
follow a common lag or path. For Fitch, political variables were the ones exclusively 
relevant, whereas for S&P, it was the country´s production index.  After a breaking point 
– the Great Recession – the rating change is triggered and both agencies begin to decrease 
ratings at a higher speed and based on different variables than before.  
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 Methodology 
We use a panel data probit model to identify the impact on rating changes following 
the equation below. This is ran for both agencies, S&P and Fitch: 
∆𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.            (1) 
Equation (1) models the impact of the possible determinants on the rating change, 
where 𝑦𝑐 is the variation of the monthly sovereign yield for each country in the given 
period. Bernoth, Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004) show that higher yield levels for EU 
countries reflect positive default and higher risk premia. In that sense, an increase 
(reduction) in the yield is assumed to deteriorate (improve) credit worthiness contributing 
to the reduction (increase) of sovereign ratings.  
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 is the variation of government debt as a percentage of GDP for each country in 
the specific month and is assumed to be one of the main variables in the CRAs rating 
analysis. The literature has a vast group of theories on the optimal sovereign debt-to-GDP 
ratio for specific countries, Reinhart et al. (2003), for example, state that “safe” levels of 
debt ratio of countries that have experienced defaults are lower than industrialized ones. 
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An increase (reduction) in debt-to-GDP is assumed to deteriorate (improve) credit 
worthiness contributing to the reduction (increase) of sovereign ratings.   
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ is GDP real growth for each country. This variable is used as a proxy for 
the effects of growth in the rating change. According to (Alesina et al., 1992), for periods 
of economic slowdown, sovereign debt becomes higher. Therefore, an increase 
(reduction) in growth performance is assumed to improve (deteriorate) credit worthiness 
contributing to the increase (reduction) of sovereign ratings.   
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 accounts for the inflation index and attempts to capture the implication of 
other economic variables in the countries´ economic performance and, therefore in its 
credit quality. (Ehrmann et al., 2007) has shown that if inflation expectations in a given 
country are not perfectly anchored, then one might expect that macroeconomic 
announcements lead to level shifts in the yield curve. A relevant increase (reduction) in 
inflation is assumed to deteriorate (improve) credit worthiness contributing to the 
reduction (increase) of sovereign ratings.   
𝑖𝑝𝑖 is the industrial production indicator that refers to the output of the industrial 
sector. This variable is used as a proxy for the effects of economic growth. Therefore, an 
increase (reduction) in industrial production is assumed to improve (deteriorate) credit 
worthiness contributing to the increase (reduction) of sovereign ratings.   
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  accounts for a World Bank Governance Indicator of Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. It ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). This variable is used as a proxy of political 
risk for each country, and, as Depken, Lafountain, and Butters (2006) described, variables 
to asses political risk are also relevant for ratings determination. In this sense, we use 
three World Bank Governance Indicators, as described below. Therefore, an increase 
(reduction) in stability is assumed to improve (deteriorate) credit worthiness contributing 
to the increase (reduction) of sovereign ratings.   
 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 is also part of the World Bank Governance Indicator and reflects 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. It 
GRAZIELLI A. PAINELI  MASTER DISSERTATION AT ISEG 
15 
 
ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). This variable is used as a proxy 
of political risk for each country. Therefore, an increase (reduction) in stability is assumed 
to improve (deteriorate) credit worthiness contributing to the increase (reduction) of 
sovereign ratings.   
Finally, 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑤 is part of the World Bank Governance Indicator and reflects 
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. It ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). This variable is used as a proxy of political 
risk for each country. Therefore, an increase (reduction) in stability is assumed to improve 
(deteriorate) credit worthiness contributing to the increase (reduction) of sovereign 
ratings. We will also use lags for the explanatory variable yield change. 
In order to verify the specific impact on rating increases and decreases, we estimate 
the model:  
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (2) 
where 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒  narrows the data sample to the events exclusively for a rating increase. 
Following (2), the model also analyses the lags in rating increase: 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑡−3 +  𝛽4𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 +
 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                     (3)  
The same is done for the rating decrease. For the sake of clarity in the results 
analysis, it is used the module of the rating decrease:       
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                     (4)                             
And 
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑡−2 +  𝛽3𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝛽4𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽10𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                    (5) 
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As the last part of the analysis, we run the lag model based on debt as well to verify 
whether the response time of the CRAs change with debt variations compared to the yield 
change variations: 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝛽4𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽10𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                    (6)  
And 
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡−2 +  𝛽3𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝛽4𝑦𝑐𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽10𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                    (7) 
 
3.1. Data 
The study considers a panel of the 28 members states of the European Union1 as of 
today, except Luxembourg, Latvia and Estonia due to lack of data in historical yields, 
measured in a monthly frequency over the time period 1997:12-2018:12. The Great 
Recession, which we call “crisis period” is considered from October/2008 onwards. 
CRAs issue their ratings on a letter grading scale; for this paper we discuss Fitch´s and 
S&P which have pretty much the same grading, as per Table I. This comprises 21 grades, 
from AAA indicating the best quality rating, to C indicating default. 
TABLE I 
3.3 Results 
The investigation starts by estimating the effect of the variables in the rating change, 
rating increase and decrease. The results are in Tables II to IV. We can see that different 
variables have the most significant impact on rating change, as per Table II. For the 
overall period, Fitch gives more relevance to the sovereign debt changes in each country, 
whereas S&P, to inflation and growth. Both agencies present significant result for the 
 
1 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech, Estonia, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.  
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crisis variable, showing that in the crisis period, there is an increase in the rating change 
occurrence.  
TABLE II 
Considering rating increase, as per Table III, both agencies continue to show some 
divergencies. To Fitch, the countries´ yield change (yc), growth, ipi and effectiveness 
contribute significantly with the expected signs: as yc grows the pace of rating increase 
diminishes; an increase in ipi and effectiveness has a positive impact in rating increase 
and positive growth contributes to the rating increase. However, rule of law shows the 
opposite sign as expected. This could show us that the perceptions of the agents regarding 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society may take longer to show up than the ratings 
upgrade. To S&P growth and yc are presented as significant with the theoretically 
expected sign.  
TABLE III 
For ratings decrease (Table IV) and taking Fitch into consideration, contrary to the 
rating increase analysis above, all economic variables become significant, with yc, 
growth, debt and inflation being all above the 95% level of confidence. As decrease is 
given in module, all variables present the expected signs. In this case, S&P also values 
most the economic variables, with yc, crisis, growth and inflation all above the 95% level. 
Once again, signs are aligned with expectations. For both agencies, as a country yield or 
inflation increases, the more the rating decreases and the higher the growth or the 
country´s effectiveness, the less ratings are decreased. The outstanding variable for rating 
decrease in this case is inflation, with the highest coefficient.  
TABLE IV 
Now we improve the previous analysis by examining also the extent to which the lags 
in increasing or decreasing sovereign ratings are affected pre crisis and post crisis based 
on the countries’ yc (Tables V and VI). First, comparing only the behaviour within the 
same category, for a rating increase (Table V) we can see that, for Fitch, the political 
variable effectiveness is significant only in the pre-crisis period. Rule of law is also 
significant but with the opposite expected sign.  After the crisis, the economic variables 
become the significant ones: inflation, growth and ipi also become significant variables, 
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all of them with the expected signs. Also, after the crisis the lag of one period is 
significant, showing a quicker response when compared to previous to the crisis. 
Considering S&P, prior to the crisis there are no significant variables, whereas after the 
crisis, growth is significant with the expected signs. 
TABLE V 
For a rating decrease (Table VI) prior to the crisis, there is no significance in the 
variables for both agencies, however, after the crisis we can see the relevant change in 
behaviour. Fitch changes its ratings with a lag of 1 or 3 periods and presents significant 
political variables, effectives and rule of law; however, it prioritizes economic variables, 
debt, growth and inflation. S&P, on the other hand, changes its ratings with a lag of 3 
periods and presents significance for the economic variables growth and inflation. 
Effectiveness is also significant, and all variables present their expected signs. All of the 
significant variables present the expected signs. 
TABLE VI 
All in all, findings in Tables V and VI show that rating agencies do have a much 
quicker response after the crisis (lower lags) and that they tend to consider different 
variables for their analysis before and after the crisis.  
Thirdly, we exam the extent to which the lags in increasing or decreasing sovereign 
ratings are affected pre crisis and post crisis based on the countries’ debt (Tables VII and 
VIII). Considering rating increase prior to the crisis (Table VII), only Fitch shows some 
significance in the first period and also for the political variables effectiveness and rule of 
law. S&P only presents ipi as significant, but no lags whatsoever. After the crisis, Fitch 
presents significant results on the second period lag, whereas S&P on the second and third 
periods. yc is significant for both, additionally ipi is relevant only for Fitch and inflation 
only for S&P. All of the significant variables present the expected signs. 
TABLE VII 
Interestingly, comparing Table VII with Table V, we note that, after the crisis, S&P 
answers on rating increase are significant for debt at period two and three, but not for yc. 
Fitch, on the other hand, replies faster for yc, with a significant coefficient in the first 
period lag 
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Now taking into account the rating decrease lags on debt (Table VIII), Fitch is the 
only agency with some significance prior to the crisis period, in the second period lag. 
After the crisis, Fitch has no significance in lags whatsoever, whereas S&P shows relevant 
results for periods one and two. Comparing Tables VIII and VI, S&P shows again a faster 
response considering debt rather than yc, whereas Fitch has the opposite result.   
TABLE VIII 
This last analysis shows a clear difference in methodology between the two rating 
agencies, but, most importantly, show that both have presented different behaviour prior 
and after the crisis, with lower lead time lags when specially decreasing ratings.  
Figure 5 in the Appendix shows the selected countries’ yield and ratings evolution 
throughout the years. The summary of the findings for rating decrease and increase is 
shown in the Figures below. 
FIGURE 1 – Significant lags in sovereign yield (yc) for Rating Decrease After the Crisis 
  
Note: The Figure shows that, after the crisis as the sovereign yield of the countries increased, Fitch 
decreases their sovereign ratings within 1 or 3 months, whereas S&P, decreases it within 3 months. 
TABLE IX 
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES FOR RATING DECREASE LAGS ON YC AFTER THE CRISIS 
Fitch S&P 
debt growth 
growth inflation 
inflation rule of law 
rule of law effectiveness 
effectiveness  
Note: The Table shows that, for the same circumstances as Figure 1 shows, both agencies present the 
same significant variables, government debt being the additional one for Fitch. 
0 1 2 3 4
Fitch
S&P
Lags on yc (months)
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For the period before the crisis there was no significance in the lags or economic or 
political variables.  
FIGURE 2 – Significant lags in sovereign yield (yc) for Rating Increase After the Crisis 
 
Note: The Figure shows that, after the crisis as the yield of the countries decreased, Fitch increases 
their sovereign ratings within 1 month, whereas S&P does not present any significance on lead lag times. 
 
TABLE X 
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES FOR RATING INCREASE LAGS ON YC AFTER THE CRISIS 
Fitch S&P 
debt growth 
inflation  
effectiveness  
rule of law  
Note: The Table shows that, for the same circumstances as Figure 2 shows, Fitch presents debt, 
inflation, effectiveness and rule of law as significant variables, whereas S&P, only growth. 
For the period before the crisis only Fitch showed some significance in the political 
variables, effectiveness and rule of law. No significance in the lags were presented for 
neither of the agencies. Table XI shows these results.  
TABLE XI 
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES FOR RATING INCREASE LAGS ON YC BEFORE THE CRISIS 
Fitch S&P 
effectiveness  
rule of law  
 
FIGURE 3 – Lags in debt for Rating Decrease After the Crisis. 
0 1 2 3 4
Fitch
S&P
Lags on yc (months)
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Note: The Figure shows that, after the crisis as the debt of the countries increased, S&P decreases 
their sovereign ratings within 1 and 2 months, whereas Fitch does not present any significance on lead lag 
times. 
 
TABLE XII 
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES FOR RATING DECREASE LAGS ON DEBT AFTER THE CRISIS 
Fitch S&P 
growth yc 
ipi growth 
inflation inflation 
effectiveness effectiveness 
rule of law  
Note: The Table shows that, for the same circumstances as Figure 3 shows, both agencies present the 
growth, inflation and effectiveness as significant variables. Additionally, Fitch also presents the political 
variables ipi and rule of law and S&P, yc. 
For the period before the crisis only Fitch showed a 2-month lag significance, 
however, no other variables presented significance. 
FIGURE 4 – Lags in debt for Rating Increase After the Crisis. 
 
Note: The Figure shows that, after the crisis as the debt of the countries decreases, S&P increases 
their sovereign ratings within 2 and 3 months, whereas Fitch, after 2 months. 
0 1 2 3 4
Fitch
S&P
Lags on Debt (months)
0 1 2 3 4
Fitch
S&P
Lags on Debt (months)
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TABLE XIII 
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES FOR RATING INCREASE LAGS ON DEBT AFTER THE CRISIS 
Fitch S&P 
yc yc 
ipi inflation 
Note: The Table shows that, for the same circumstances as Figure 4 shows, both agencies present the 
yc as significant variables. Additionally, Fitch also presents ipi and S&P, inflation. 
For the period before the crisis only Fitch showed a 1-month lag significance, as the 
variables below. 
TABLE XIV 
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES FOR RATING INCREASE LAGS ON DEBT BEFORE THE CRISIS 
Fitch S&P 
effectiveness ipi 
rule of law  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we studied Fitch and S&P´s difference in behaviour in the determination 
of sovereign credit ratings for the EU prior and after the Great Recession (October/2008 
onwards). We consider a panel of the 28 members states of the European Union2 as of 
today, except Luxembourg, Latvia and Estonia, measured in a monthly frequency over 
the time period 1997:12-2018:12.  
Our empirical findings indicate that both agencies have significant different 
behaviours prior vs after the Great Recession. On a nutshell, after the crisis economic 
variables became the most significant, whereas political variables were the main 
significant variable before the crisis. Also, the lead lag on rating decrease diminished 
substantially after the crisis for both agencies with the difference that Fitch downgraded 
faster based on the countries’ yield change, whereas S&P did it based on debt to debt 
ratio.  
 
2 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech, Estonia, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.  
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We conclude the work with a discussion that may be extended in further research: 
CRAs decisions are subjected to overconfidence, which leads decision makers to have 
the tendency to focus on their own abilities and successes rather than on situational 
factors. However, given an external shock, suck as a crisis, this behaviour changed 
dramatically to all agencies, consequently leading to heard behaviour and the “cliff 
effect”. Our research corroborate previous works showing that the agencies have indeed 
changed their assessment after the Great Recession and that given a downgrade (upgrade) 
by the first rating agency, subsequent downgrades (upgrades) by the second rating agency 
are of greater magnitude in the short term and, harsher rating changes by one agency are 
followed by harsher rating changes in the same direction by the second agency. 
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TABLE I 
Category 
Linear 
Transform. 
Fitch S&P Credit Quality 
Investment 
Grade 
21 AAA AAA Highest quality 
 20 AA+ AA+  
 19 AA AA High Quality 
 18 AA- AA-  
 17 A+ A+  
 16 A A Strong payment capacity 
 15 A- A-  
 14 BBB+ BBB+  
 13 BBB BBB Adequate payment capacity 
 12 BBB- BBB-  
Speculative 11 BB+ BB+  
 10 BB BB Likely to fulfil obligations 
 9 BB- BB-  
 8 B+ B+  
 7 B B High credit risk 
 6 B- B-  
 5 CCC+ CCC  
 4 CCC CC Very high credit risk 
 3 CCC- C  
 2 CC CC Default 
 1 C, DDD, DD, D C, D  
Source: CRAs websites, formatted by the author.  
 
TABLE II 
MODELLING RATING CHANGE 
 Total Period Total Period 
 Fitch S&P 
yc 0.212 0.024 
crisis 0.219** 1.058*** 
debt 0.438* 0.001 
growth -1.810 -2.610* 
ipi 0.887 0.453 
inflation  -0.551 6.006** 
stability -0.065 -0.270 
effectiveness -0.162 -0.708 
ruleoflaw -0.124 0.384 
Nº observations 4,696 4,708 
 Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.  
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TABLE IIII 
MODELLING RATING INCREASE 
 Total Period Total Period 
 Fitch S&P 
yc -0.229*** -0.283*** 
crisis 0.060 0.752*** 
debt -0.038 -0.003 
growth 4.730** 6.263*** 
ipi 1.983** 1.675 
inflation  -0.949 -0.497 
stability 0.082 0.157 
effectiveness 0.712** 0.210 
ruleoflaw -1.068*** -0.390 
Nº observations 4,696 4,708 
 Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.  
 
TABLE IV 
MODELLING RATING DECREASE 
 Total Period Total Period 
 Fitch S&P 
yc 0.157** 0.177*** 
crisis 0.685*** 1.107*** 
debt 0.077*** -0.001 
growth -4.183*** -5.923*** 
ipi -0.571 0.471 
inflation  7.235** 9.390*** 
stability -0.148 -0.252 
effectiveness -0.770** -1.076** 
ruleoflaw 0.644* 0.830* 
Nº observations 4,696 4,708 
Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.  
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TABLE V 
MODELLING RATING INCREASE LAGS ON YC 
 Crisis = 0 Crisis = 0 Crisis = 1 Crisis = 1 
 Fitch S&P Fitch S&P 
yc     
  lag1 0.181 0.427 -0.179** -0.036 
  lag2 0.250 1.032 -0.211 -0.210 
  lag3 0.423 -0.729 0.003 -0.064 
  lag4 0.506 1.019 0.037 -0.111 
debt 0.470 -0.004 -0.077 0.002 
growth 3.474 -16.918 4.46** 6.714*** 
ipi 1.288 12.903 2.079** 1.159 
inflation  -0.318 1.488 -4.420** -5.741 
stability 0.111 1.156 0.248 0.279 
effectiveness 1.256* 0.808 0.132 0.135 
ruleoflaw -1.715* -2.820 -0.690 -0.387 
Nº observations 1,825 1,837 2,790 2,790 
Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
Note: Crisis from October/2008 
 
 
TABLE VI 
MODELLING RATING DECREASE LAGS ON YC 
 Crisis = 0 Crisis = 0 Crisis = 1 Crisis = 1 
 Fitch S&P Fitch S&P 
yc     
  lag1 0.131 0.043 -0.180** 0.079 
  lag2 -0.426 1.685 0.081 0.075 
  lag3 0.518 -0.963 0.145** 0.127** 
  lag4 -1.065 -0.051 0.091 -0.012 
debt -0.158 -0.023 0.084*** 0.015 
growth -6.245 -18.432 -3.53* -5.730*** 
ipi 0.657 3.438 0.084 0.395 
inflation  1.285 6.403 7.895** 7.854** 
stability 0.177 -0.540 -0.178 -0.116 
effectiveness 0.225 -0.350 -0.936** -1.013* 
ruleoflaw -0.797 -0.195 0.833* 0.772* 
Nº observations 1,825 1,837 2,790 2,790 
Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
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TABLE VII 
MODELLING RATING INCREASE LAGS ON DEBT 
 Crisis = 0 Crisis = 0 Crisis = 1 Crisis = 1 
 Fitch S&P Fitch S&P 
debt     
  lag1 -0.160** -0.552 0.065 0.026 
  lag2 -0.094 0.199 -0.140** -0.149* 
  lag3 -0.013 -0.122 -0.007 0.187** 
  lag4 0.102 0.180 -0.083 -0.029 
yc -0.310 0.161 -0.201* -0.304*** 
growth 4.247 -15.088 3.177 4.342 
ipi 1.379 12.852* 1.956* 1.159 
inflation  -0.561 1.489 -4.712 -5.804* 
stability 0.107 1.241 0.216 0.223 
effectiveness 0.938* -0.231 0.099 -0.032 
ruleoflaw -1.327** -2.116 -0.680 -0.365 
Nº observations 1,780 1,802 2,796 2,797 
Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
 
TABLE VIII 
MODELLING RATING DECREASE LAGS ON DEBT 
 Crisis = 0 Crisis = 0 Crisis = 1 Crisis = 1 
 Fitch S&P Fitch S&P 
debt     
  lag1 -0.003 -0.409 -0.021 0.096** 
  lag2 -0.370*** 0.455 -0.041 0.080* 
  lag3 -0.088 -0.192 0.013 -0.048 
  lag4 0.009 0.560 -0.014 -0.028 
yc 0.158 -0.594 0.145 0.190*** 
growth -5.107 -18.032 -2.168** -4.755*** 
ipi -0.246 4.846 -0.081** 0.717 
inflation  -0.794 6.342 12.645*** 7.756** 
stability 0.340 -0.909 -0.284 -0.043 
effectiveness -0.297 -1.113 -1.159* -0.970* 
ruleoflaw -0.528 -0.016 1.059* -0.689 
Nº observations 1,780 1,802 2,796 2,797 
Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
          APPENDICES 
TABLE IX 
SOURCES 
Variable Source 
 Fitch 
yc Thomson Reuters Eikon 
debt Eurostat 
growth https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=EU 
ipi https://data.oecd.org/industry/industrial-production.htm 
inflation  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database?node_code=teicp000# 
stability http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home 
effectiveness http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home 
ruleoflaw http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home 
Fitch 
Ratings 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
S&P 
Ratings 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
 
FIGURE 5 
SOVEREIGN YIELDS AND FITCH RATINGS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES  
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